Scottish politics - straight to the EU or ETFA first?

Foreword: The post that follows goes over an issue already addressed in my previous post on Scottish Politics - namely rejoining the EU, or not, after independence. This post attempts to expand on my argument with a few more observations.

On Monday 27th March 2023, the SNP announced that Humza Yousaf had won the battle to be the party’s new leader and, over the next couple of days, he was confirmed as the new First Minister of Scotland, replacing Nicola Sturgeon in both positions. During the campaign all three SNP leadership candidates seemed to be making clear that a priority would be to get a consistent majority in favour of independence (while, at the same time, looking after the immediate problems of running the country). The figure of 51% was mentioned but I believe that at least 55% will be required, over an extended period of time, before Westminster might buckle and either permit a section 30 order or enter into independence negotiations. But what must the SNP, and wider YES movement, do to increase support in this way? There are several things which could be done but, for me, one of those is for the SNP to change it’s stance on full EU membership after independence. I’m not, to be clear, saying that this should be totally abandoned - just that joining EFTA first, followed by another EU referendum (to determine if the people of Scotland still want Scotland to be a full EU member country), would be the best policy to follow to begin with. That is what I would prefer, anyway - but there is a practical reason behind this suggestion. Some background to explain this

1 - the 2016 EU referendum only offered a simple IN/OUT choice - when, in reality, there should have been at least three choices. In addition to that the OUT/LEAVE choice did not make clear what type of Brexit was being voted for: a hard Brexit, that the UK Tory government took us down (and has caused so much damage, for at least Scotland), or a soft, EFTA style, Brexit.
2 - while two thirds of Scots voted to REMAIN, a third voted to LEAVE - and that apparently included a third of SNP supporters. Who knows how the voting would have split if a third option had been on offer or if in voting LEAVE it was fully understood that it was going to be a hard Brexit? Although a third of the voters is clearly a minority it still represents large number of people and, I would argue, it will not take many to swing to supporting YES on a permanent basis for YES to have a consistent majority needed.
3 - the 2016 vote was to settle the relationship between the UK and the EU - but the situation, following independence, would be different. Following independence it would no longer be a simple two way relationship to consider but a three way one between the EU, rUK and Scotland. An independent Scotland, just seeking to get back into the EU, with no further debate, simply does not take this change in circumstances into account. If Scotland achieves independence then a further EU referendum is, for me, the only reasonable way forward in order that this change in circumstance can be fully considered. I’d prefer we joined EFTA and remained in that organisation but I’m more than happy to go along with what the majority want - but I’d want to see the Scottish public being given the opportunity, given the changed circumstances, to express their views once again (just as the SNP claim the right of the Scottish electorate to vote again on independence).

That’s the background, but what is the practical reason, mentioned above, and how does that tie into winning over some of those not fully convinced of the benefits of independence?
While the EU market is potentially much bigger than Scotland’s rUK market, the current situation is that Scotland’s main trade is with rUK - and Scotland rejoining the EU could damage that, in both directions, long before new trade with the EU could be generated to cover those losses in trade with rUK. This could well affect Scotland’s economic position and make the early years of independence more difficult than they are likely to be, anyway. The unionists are using this to scare voters into not supporting independence - because many fear for their financial future should that scare story prove accurate. A bird in the hand is, after all, worth two in the bush. It also needs to be made clear that trade between an independent Scotland and rUK will not end (just as trade between the UK and the EU has not ended). It will, however, be subject to tariffs which will increase costs, in both directions, such that goods will become more expensive to both buy and sell. On top of that would be the increased red tape to deal with. This could well result in a loss of trade between Scotland and rUK. Note as well that the unionists argue this point from both sides - and no-one seems to have picked up on this. The unionists claim that the SNP policy of rejoining the EU will result in a hard border between Scotland and rUK and that this will result in the loss of trade outlined above. They also point out that such a border will require passports to move between Scotland and rUK and they use this to persuade people that this is an issue which mitigates against independence. Then, in the very next breathe, they rubbish the SNP’s plan of rejoining the EU by suggesting that an independent Scotland would not be allowed to rejoin the EU for years - at least five if not ten. Those arguments are contradictory. If the unionists are correct, and Scotland rejoining the EU will take between five and ten years, then there is no need for a hard border between Scotland and rUK during that period of time. In addition to that, Scotland during that period, could seek to generate more trade with the EU such that it gradually replaces it’s rUK trade with EU trade (via, for example, EFTA membership). That would means that trade between Scotland and rUK would not, for many years, be subject to EU tariffs and who knows what the situation might be before Scotland could rejoin the EU. For example, a Starmer led Labour UK government might well renegotiate a new deal with the EU such that this aspect would no longer be an issue for Scotland to be concerned about.
However, Scotland being allowed to rejoin the EU quickly could well result in trade tariffs between Scotland and rUK being required sooner rather than later. Joining EFTA, instead of the EU, avoids this potential problem as, under those conditions, Scotland would not be restricted in making trade deals with other countries - and that includes rUK. Joining EFTA also gets rid of the ogre (for many) of a serious border between Scotland and rUK. There would still be a border but, thanks to the Westminster government, it’s the borders between the UK and the EU that are now the issue as regards the Single Market and free movement of people. If Scotland was not an EU member then that would be much less of an issue and the border issue would be much reduced.
The above might well, on it’s own, be well short of achieving the % swing in the vote that’s required - but every little bit would help. Some might fear that this would turn away those who really want to rejoin the EU - but, as said above, I’m not suggesting this should be abandoned but, instead, delayed - although abandoning full EU membership might be an option if EFTA became, clearly, the best option. This might depend upon rUK’s ongoing relationship with the EU.

Having said all the above, Humza Yousaf has already indicated that the SNP policy of Scotland rejoining the EU remains. I find that slightly disappointing  - but all three candidates for the leadership also promised a more open SNP willing to listen to it’s members and the public. I hope, in that case, that Humza, and the SNP, stick to that and consider the advantages of EFTA membership first, followed by a Scottish EU referendum some years down the line, after independence, to determine the views of the Scottish people at that stage (many years after the 2016 EU referendum). This would indeed indicate a more open and listening SNP.